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In this paper we study the cooperative behavior of agents playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in random
scale-free networks. We show that the survival of cooperation is enhanced with respect to random homogeneous
graphs but, on the other hand, decreases when compared to that found in Baraba´si-Albert scale-free networks.
We show that the latter decrease is related with the structure of cooperation. Additionally, we present a mean
field approximation for studying evolutionary dynamics in networks with no degree-degree correlations and
with arbitrary degree distribution. The mean field approach is similar to the one used for describing the disease
spreading in complex networks, making a further compartmentalization of the strategists partition into degree-
classes. We show that this kind of approximation is suitable to describe the behavior of the system for a particular
set of initial conditions, such as the placement of cooperators in the higher-degree classes, while it fails to
reproduce the level of cooperation observed in the numerical simulations for arbitrary initial configurations.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Kg, 02.50.Le, 89.75.Fb
I. INTRODUCTION
The ubiquity of cooperation at all scales of life’s organiza-
tion from genes, through multicellular organisms, to animal
and human societies, has not been immediately accommo-
dated in the theory of evolution [Nowak, 2006]. In fact, to un-
derstand the observed survival of cooperative behavior when
selfish actions provide a higher reproductive success (fitness)
several mechanisms (non mutually exclusive) have been pro-
posed: a) Kin selection, based on genetic relatedness, b) group
selection, in which the demes (groups) instead of organisms
are the entities on which natural selection acts upon, and c)
reciprocal altruism, which includes direct reciprocity (through
repeated interactions) and diverse types of indirect reciprocity
(through reputation, scoring, punishment, signaling, etc...).
Perhaps the simplest (i.e. less demanding) mechanism,
termed lattice (or network) reciprocity, consists of assuming
that each agent interacts only with its neighbors as given by a
network of social contacts. Early pioneering numerical work
by Nowak and May [Nowak & May, 1992] on the evolutionary
∗To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: gar-
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dynamics of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (see below) in two-
dimensional regular (square) lattices, showed that the cooper-
ative phenotype was not driven to extinction. This result stim-
ulated much work paying attention to the evolution of cooper-
ation in graph-structured populations [Szabo´ & Fa´th, 2007]. It
has been well recognized that graph topologies play a crucial
role in providing positive feedback evolutionary mechanisms
that facilitate the asymptotic survival of cooperation. There-
fore, it is necessary to change the benchmark of evolutionary
game theory from unstructured or “well-mixed populations to
the more realistic case of complex networks.
Interactions in animal and human social systems are, in
general, modelled on sets of individuals playing diverse so-
cial dilemmas games. In these games, players can adopt two
possible strategies: cooperation (C) and defection (D). In the
classical setting, a player i plays with all the other individ-
uals in the system accumulating, in each of these games, a
payoff that depends on both its strategy and the one adopted
by its corresponding opponent. In particular, both C and D
receive R (reward) under mutual cooperation and P (punish-
ment) under mutual defection, while C receives S (suckers)
when confronted to D, which in turn receives T (temptation).
The specific values that take the latter payoffs define the spe-
cific social dilemma we are dealing with. From now on, we
will consider the case T > R > P > S so that we will focus
2on the Prisoner’s Dilemma game [Hamilton, 1964; Axelrod
& Hamilton, 1981; Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1998; Hofbauer &
Sigmund, 2003; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005].
Once every agent has played the game with the rest of the
population, i.e. has completed a game’s round-robin, selec-
tion takes place and each player is allowed to change its strat-
egy. Following the replicator dynamics [Hofbauer & Sigmund
1998, Gintis 2000], the probability that an agent adopt a dif-
ferent strategy in the next generation depends on the differ-
ence between its payoff and the average payoff of the system.
Under these conditions (well-mixed hypothesis or mean field
approximation), the fraction of cooperators will unavoidably
decrease in time towards zero. Therefore, it seems clear that in
order to answer the question about how cooperative behavior
can survive in animal and human social systems one has to re-
lax the hypothesis considered above, such as the well-mixing
assumption.
In the last decade, scientist have unveiled the structure of
many complex systems, and have described them in terms of
complex networks [Bornholdt & Schuster, 2003; Dorogovtsev
& Mendes, 2003; Newman, 2003; Boccaletti, Latora, Moreno,
Chavez & Hwang, 2006]. These networks are the backbone of
complex systems and hence they are the substrates on top of
which a number of relevant dynamics (such as disease spread-
ing, information transmission or human traits) occur. The
structure of complex networks is far from being described
with a fixed value k accounting for the typical number of in-
teractions that an element shares with the rest of the system.
On the other hand, it has been measured that the distribution
of the number of contacts (or alternatively the degree) of the
elements follows a power-law, P (k) ∼ k−γ , i.e. the networks
are scale-free (SF). Moreover, many measures of real complex
networks have obtained an exponent 2 < γ < 3 for the power-
law degree distribution, pointing out that the variance 〈k2〉 of
this statistical distribution diverges in the infinite population
limit. Taking into account these results, it becomes clear that
any mathematical model or numerical simulation aimed at de-
scribing the cooperative behavior in real social systems has to
incorporate the scale-free nature of the social contact network.
In this paper we will study the cooperation in random scale-
free networks. First, in section II, we will analyze the evolu-
tion and the structure of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma
game through numerical simulations of the evolutionary dy-
namics. In particular, we will study the average level of co-
operation sustained by random SF networks and how cooper-
ators and defectors are arranged across the network. We will
compare our results with those obtained by previous studies
on other, scale-free or not, network topologies. In the sec-
ond part of the paper, section III, we present a mean field ap-
proximation that divides players into classes accordingly to
their number of contacts. The mean field approximation is
shown to be correct for particular sets of initial conditions and
hence provides a useful analytical tool for studying the co-
operation in complex networks (in particular for those graphs
with a long-tailed degree distribution). Finally, in section IV,
we round off the paper by summarizing the main results of the
work.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF COOPERATION IN RANDOM
SCALE-FREE NETWORKS
In the recent years, a number of studies have stud-
ied the prisoner’s dilemma on top of complex networks
[Eguı´luz, Zimmermann, Cela-Conde & San Miguel, 2005;
Lieberman, Hauert & Nowak, 2005; Santos & Pacheco,
2005; Ohtsuki, Hauert, Lieberman & Nowak, 2006; San-
tos & Pacheco, 2006; Santos, Pacheco & Lenaerts, 2006;
Go´mez-Garden˜es, Campillo, Florı´a & Moreno, 2007; Pon-
cela, Go´mez-Garden˜es, Florı´a & Moreno, 2007; Szabo´ &
Fath, 2007; Go´mez-Garden˜es, Poncela, Florı´a & Moreno,
2008; Szolnoki, Perc & Danku, 2008; Vukov, Szabo´ & Szol-
noki, 2008]. These works have determined that SF networks
enhance cooperation when compared to homogeneous ran-
dom networks such as Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graphs (described by a
Poisson degree distribution, P (k) ∼ e〈k〉〈k〉k/k!). However,
these works have mainly focused on SF networks constructed
via the celebrated Bara´basi-Albert (BA) model [Baraba´si &
Albert, 1999]. The BA model considers that the network is
grown from an initial core of m0 nodes, incorporating a new
node to the network every time step. Every new node launches
m links to the nodes already present in the growing network
following a preferential attachment rule (i.e. the probability
of receiving a link from the new node is proportional to the
degree of the nodes).
The networks generated using the BA model have a power-
law degree distribution with γ = 3 but, at the same time,
they posses important features that make them different from
random SF networks constructed by means of purely statisti-
cal algorithms such as the Molloy-Reed configurational model
[Molloy & Reed, 1998]. These differences are manifested in
the so-called age-correlations [Dorogovtsev & Mendes, 2003;
Newman, 2003] that have as a consequence the interconnec-
tion of highly-connected elements or hubs. The links between
hubs have been shown to play a crucial role in the survival of
cooperation [Santos & Pacheco, 2005] since when they are re-
moved the cooperation level decreases notably (although it re-
mains larger than those observed in regular and homogeneous
graphs).
In fact, a careful inspection of the structure of cooperation
in BA SF networks [Go´mez-Garden˜es, Campillo, Florı´a &
Moreno, 2007] reveals that cooperators are arranged in a very
cohesive way. In particular, they are glued together into a sin-
gle cooperator cluster sustained by the highly connected nodes
that always play as cooperators [Go´mez-Garden˜es, Poncela,
Florı´a & Moreno, 2008]. Our first goal in the study of random
SF networks is to check if the deletion of the hub-to-hub links
affects the structure of cooperation observed in BA networks,
explaining qualitatively the drop in the cooperation level as a
break down of the cohesive arrangement of cooperators.
To study the structure of cooperation in random SF net-
works we have performed a rewiring of the SF networks ob-
tained by means of the BA model. Following the scheme
shown in [Maslov & Sneppen, 2002] the rewiring process de-
stroys any kind of correlations present in the original network
preserving the degree sequence of the graph, and thus keeping
the same degree distribution (P (k) ∼ k−3) as in the origi-
3nal BA network. The networks generated in this work have
N = 4000 and 〈k〉 = 4.
Once the network is constructed, we perform the numeri-
cal simulation of the evolutionary dynamics as dictated by the
prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix with P = S = 0, R = 1,
T = b > 1, so that we deal with only one control parameter:
the temptation to defect b. We start from an initial configura-
tion with equal number of C and D players (c = d = N/2)
that are randomly distributed across the network nodes. At
each generation of the discrete evolutionary time t, each agent
i plays once with every agent in its neighborhood and accu-
mulates the obtained payoffs Pi. Then, all the players update
synchronously their strategies by the following rules. Each
individual i chooses at random a neighbor j and compares its
payoff Pi with Pj . If Pi > Pj, player i keeps the same strat-
egy for the next generation. On the other hand, if Pj > Pi,
the player i adopts the strategy of its neighbor j for the next
game round robin with probability [Santos & Pacheco, 2005]:
Πi→j = β(Pj − Pi) . (1)
Here, β is the characteristic inverse time scale: the larger β the
faster evolution takes place. Additionally, we consider β =
(max{ki, kj}b)−1 assuring that Πi→j ≤ 1.
Let us now explain the details of the numerical analysis. We
let the system evolve until a stationary regime is reached. The
stationary regime is characterized by a stable average level of
cooperation 〈c〉, that is the fraction of C players in the net-
work, 〈c〉 = c/N . To compute 〈c〉 we let the dynamics evolve
over a transient time τ0 = 5 · 103, and we further evolve the
system over time windows of τ = 103 generations. In each
time window, we compute the average value and the fluctua-
tions of c(t). When the fluctuations are less than or equal to
1/
√
N , we stop the simulation and consider the average co-
operation obtained in the last time window as the asymptotic
average cooperation 〈c〉. In order to make an extensive sam-
pling of initial conditions and network realizations we have
performed 103 numerical simulations for each value of the
temptation b studied, and averaged accordingly the values 〈c〉
found in the realizations. In figure 1.a we have plotted the
evolution of the average level of cooperation 〈c〉 as a function
of b. Our results confirm the findings of [Santos & Pacheco,
2005]: the removal of age-correlations makes SF networks
less robust to defection than BA networks. However, the fig-
ure shows that 〈c〉(b) > 0 until larger values of b as compared
to the cooperation levels found for homogeneous ER graphs
[Go´mez-Garden˜es, Campillo, Florı´a & Moreno, 2007].
To measure the structure of cooperation we follow the ap-
proach introduced in [Go´mez-Garden˜es, Campillo, Florı´a &
Moreno, 2007]. Once the system has reached the stationary
regime, we let the system evolve again for τs = 104 addi-
tional time steps, and measure the relevant magnitudes for the
dynamical characterization of the stationary state. In partic-
ular, we label each player in one of the following three cate-
gories: pure cooperators (PC), pure defectors (PD) and fluc-
tuating (F) players. Pure cooperator (pure defector) strategists
are those players that adopt cooperation (defection) during all
the τs generations. Conversely, fluctuating players are those
agents that play both as defectors and cooperators at the sta-
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FIG. 1: (a) Evolution of the average level of cooperation 〈c〉 as a
function of the temptation to defect b in random SF graphs. The
panel also shows the corresponding evolution for the fraction of pure
cooperators (PC), pure defectors (PD) and fluctuating (F) players.
(b) Evolution of the number of cooperator clusters Ncc and defector
clusters Ndc as a function of b.
tionary regime, and hence change their strategies during the
time window of length τs. In figure 1.a we also plot the frac-
tion of PC, PD, and F players as a function of the temptation
b. The evolution of the three fractions follows the expected
behavior: PC decrease with b, whereas F players first increase
and occupy macroscopically the network. Finally, F agents
are progressively replaced by PD until all the network is fully
occupied by pure defectors. Remarkably, the number of PC
is surprisingly lower than both BA and homogeneous ER net-
works. Instead, in random SF graphs the average level of co-
operation is sustained by those F players that dominate the
population of the network in the range 1.2 < b < 1.9.
Once we have identified the PC, PD and F players we define
the cooperator and defector clusters. A cooperator (defector)
cluster is a connected subgraph composed of nodes that are
pure cooperators (defectors) and the links between them. In
figure 1.b we have plotted the number of cooperators and de-
fectors clusters as a function of b. The first difference with
respect to BA networks is that here we find realizations with
more than one cooperator cluster. This difference explains the
4drop in the cooperation level observed in [Santos & Pacheco,
2005]: the more fragmented the cooperators are arranged the
less sources of benefits they find in their surroundings and the
larger is the probability to be invaded by the instantaneous de-
fectors that are in contact with them. Regarding the defector
clusters we observe the same picture as in BA networks: PD
are arranged in several clusters when they start to invade the
network (b ≃ 2). The number of defector clusters decrease as
they start to grow in size and finally collapse into a single one
only when all the network is totally invaded by pure defectors.
We have also checked the probability that a node of degree k
is a cooperator in the stationary regime. Our numerical sim-
ulations show that, in agreement with previous numerical ob-
servations in BA networks [Go´mez-Garden˜es, Poncela, Florı´a
& Moreno, 2008], high degree nodes are more likely to act as
cooperators than intermediate or low degree individuals.
Summing up the previous results, in random SF networks,
the fragmentation of the cooperator clusters together with the
extremely low fraction of pure cooperators and the prevalence
of fluctuating individuals lead to an organization of coopera-
tion that is radically different to that observed in BA SF net-
works.
III. THE DEGREE-BASED MEAN FIELD
APPROXIMATION
The random SF graphs analyzed above are free of any kind
of correlation between the properties (age, degree, etc...) of
two adjacent nodes. Therefore, it is amenable to study analyt-
ically the evolution of the cooperation by considering a similar
approach to that used for diffusion processes in complex net-
works [Pastor-Satorras & Vespignani, 2001a; Pastor-Satorras
& Vespignani, 2001b; Moreno, Pastor-Satorras & Vespignani,
2002] with arbitrary degree distributions and no correlations.
To incorporate the heterogeneity in the number of social con-
tacts of individuals we make a further compartmentalization
of the strategists in degree-classes. In this sense, we label ck
and dk as the fraction of cooperators and defectors with de-
gree k so that the total number of cooperators and defectors
is, respectively
c = N
∑
k
P (k)ck , (2)
d = N
∑
k
P (k)dk . (3)
Obviously the relation ck + dk = 1 holds and therefore we
write the evolution of the fraction of cooperators with degree
k as
c˙k = (1 − ck)ΠDCk − ckΠCDk , (4)
where ΠDCk (ΠCDk ) is the probability that a cooperator (defec-
tor) of degree k change its strategy to defection (cooperation).
Assuming that the network has no degree-degree correlations,
and following the replicator-like update rule (1), we can write
the probabilities ΠDCk and ΠCDk as
ΠDCk =
∑
k′
k
′
P (k
′
)
〈k〉 β Θ
[
PC
k′
− PDk
]
ck′ , (5)
ΠCDk =
∑
k′
k
′
P (k
′
)
〈k〉 β Θ
[
PD
k′
− PCk
]
(1− ck′ ) , (6)
where the function Θ[x] is defined as Θ[x] = x if x > 0 and
Θ[x] = 0 otherwise. Besides, PCk and PDk are the payoffs ob-
tained by a cooperator and a defector of degree k respectively,
and can be written as
PCk = k
∑
k′
k
′
P (k
′
)
〈k〉 ck′ = klc , (7)
PDk = b · klc , (8)
where lc is the probability that a node has a cooperator neigh-
bor. Now we can insert the above two expressions (7) and (8)
in equations (6) and (5) and finally write the evolution equa-
tion (4) as
c˙k = (1 − ck)
∑
k′>bk
k
′
P (k
′
)
〈k〉 β lc(k
′ − bk)ck′
− ck
∑
k′>bk
k
′
P (k
′
)
〈k〉 β lc(bk
′ − k)(1 − ck′ )
− ck
bk∑
k′>k/b
k
′
P (k
′
)
〈k〉 β lc(bk
′ − k)(1 − ck′ ) , (9)
where we have separated the contributions to the transition
C→D that come from neighbors with k′ > bk and k′ < bk, so
that it is clear that the number of degree classes that participate
in the transition C→D is larger than those that influence the
change D→C.
The main assumption behind the above mean field approach
is that the average level of cooperation inside a degree-class,
ck, is a proper magnitude for describing the state of nodes with
this degree. In particular, this assumption is strictly correct
when ck is either 1 or 0. This motivate us to study the solution
of equations (9) using a particular set of initial conditions: the
targeted cooperation.
We define targeted cooperation as a set of initial conditions
for of the system (9) for which ck(0) = 1 if k > k∗ and
ck(0) = 0 if k < k∗. We have carefully explored the solu-
tions of equations (9) when P (k) is a power-law degree distri-
bution. To this end, we have studied power-laws with several
values of γ and used different values for the degree thresh-
old k∗. The numerical solution of equations (9) reveals that
the cooperation level remains for b > 1, reaching a station-
ary value that depends on both the value of b and that of the
threshold k∗. In figure 2 we show the time evolution of the av-
erage level of cooperation for several values of b and k∗ = 2
and k∗ = 3. The degree distribution in the figure is a power-
law with γ = 3. The solutions show that the larger k∗ and/or
b are the lower the cooperation level is.
5FIG. 2: (Color online). The two panels show the time evolution of
the fraction of cooperators 〈c〉(t) obtained solving equation (9) when
targeted cooperation is used as initial conditions and being P (k) a
power-law with γ = 3. The different curves correspond to several
values of b (as shown in the bottom of the figure). The targeted co-
operation used correspond to (a) k∗ = 2 and (b) k∗ = 3.
It is interesting to study in detail the effect of the thresh-
old k∗ over the asymptotic level of cooperation. In particular,
we can obtain the minimum amount of degree classes that we
have to fill initially with cooperators so that cooperation is
able to survive asymptotically in the network. We have ex-
plored different sets of initial conditions corresponding to dif-
ferent values of k∗. Starting from a low value of k∗ we have
solved equations (9) and computed the final level of cooper-
ation 〈c〉. If 〈c〉 > 0 we increase the value of k∗ and solve
again the system (9). This process is iterated until we reach a
value k∗c for which cooperation vanishes. The computed value
k∗c thus represents the minimal amount of cooperator degree
classes needed at time 0 to sustain asymptotically a nonzero
level of cooperation. In figure 3 we have plotted the func-
tions k∗c (b) for three power-law degree distributions (γ = 2,
3, 4). Obviously, we observe that as the temptation to defect
increases it is necessary to fill more degree classes to assure
a nonzero level of cooperation. More interestingly, we show
that the heterogeneity of the network increases the value of k∗c .
This results is related to the fact that filling a given amount of
degree classes is more efficient (more nodes are initially set as
cooperators) when the network is more heterogeneous.
Computing the phase diagram k∗c (b) is a difficult task if we
only rely on the results of the numerical simulations of the
evolutionary dynamics on top of the graphs. Therefore, the
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FIG. 3: Phase diagram k∗c (b). The three curves correspond to differ-
ent power-law distributions (namely, γ = 4, 3 and 2). Each curve
k∗c (b) represent the border between two different asymptotic regimes
for the evolution of equations (9) with targeted cooperation: The area
below the curves correspond to the points (b, k∗) where targeted co-
operation yield nonzero asymptotic level of cooperation. Conversely,
the area above the curves correspond to the targeted initial conditions
for which the evolution of equations (9) yields 〈c〉 → 0.
mean field approach represents, in this context, a useful tool
for substituting computationally expensive numerical simula-
tions. However, how accurate are the results of the solutions
of equations (9) when compared to numerical simulations? To
check the reliability of the degree-based mean field approach
in the context of targeted cooperation we have computed the
diagram 〈c〉(b) for random SF networks with γ = 3 using two
different sets of initial conditions corresponding to k∗ = 3 and
4. In figure 4 we show the results of the numerical simulations
compared to the results obtained by solving equations (9). Ob-
viously, the agreement is not complete but the evolution of the
cooperation as a function of b follows the same qualitative be-
havior and the cooperation tends to zero (〈c〉 & 0) around the
same values of b. The values of b for which 〈c〉 = 0 in each of
the curves of the figures are obviously related to the values k∗c .
Our results show that the curves 〈c〉(b) obtained from numer-
ical simulations reach larger values of b with 〈c〉 > 0. On the
other hand, the numerical simulations yield very low values
of 〈c〉 for those values of b for which cooperation asymptoti-
cally vanishes solving equations (9). Therefore, the mean field
approach seems to be of help to study the behavior of k∗c (b)
and the asymptotic level of cooperation of the system when
targeted cooperation is initially placed in the system.
Regarding general (i.e. non-targeted cooperation type of)
initial conditions for the degree-based mean field equations
(9), some comments are in order. For both, power-law and
Poisson degree distributions P (k), random uniformly dis-
tributed values for ck(0), as well as fixed value ck(0) = 0.5
(mimicking the initial conditions in the numerical simulations
of previous section), led to asymptotic zero level of coop-
eration as soon as b > 1. This suggests that, generically
speaking, mean field approaches (even in generalized forms,
as equations (9)) to the evolutionary dynamics of prisoner’s
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FIG. 4: Evolution of the asymptotic level of cooperation 〉 obtained
when (i) solving the mean field (MF) equations (9) and (ii) computed
through numerical simulations (NS) of the evolutionary dynamics on
top of a random SF network. The degree distribution used is a power-
law with γ = 3. In both cases we have set targeted cooperation
as initial conditions for the evolutionary dynamics. We have used
k∗ = 3 and 4.
dilemma games on graphs are likely bound to fail to account
for the numerically observed survival of cooperation. This
would be in agreement with results reported elsewhere [Florı´a,
Gracia-La´zaro, Go´mez-Garden˜es & Moreno, 2008] on a par-
ticular type of artificial networks that allow a rigorous analy-
sis of the issue. To put it in plain terms, the lattice reciprocity
mechanisms that enhance the evolutionary survival of coop-
eration in network settings seem to be out of reach from the
(homogeneity) mean field assumptions, in the sense that they
are associated in an essential way to fluctuations of averaged
quantities, like ck which are the basic descriptors in mean field
approaches.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Scale-free networks have been recently shown as the graphs
that better promote cooperation. In this article we have shown
that the power-law degree distribution cannot be considered
as the only root for the promotion of cooperation. At variance
with the Baraba´si-Albert networks, the SF graphs considered
in this work are free of any kind of node-node correlation.
The first conclusion of our study is that cooperation decays
when no correlations are present in the network. Moreover,
we have shown that the organization of cooperation is dra-
matically different from that of the BA network, showing that
cooperators can arrange in more than one cluster increasing
the probability of being invaded by defectors. In other words,
the fixation of cooperation is much lower than in SF networks
with correlations, thus completing the picture provided by
other studies where correlations were added into SF networks
[Assenza, Go´mez-Garden˜es & Latora, 2008; Push, Weber &
Porto, 2008] enhancing the promotion of cooperation of BA
networks. Therefore, one one hand, our study in random SF
networks can be considered as the null model for the study
of the cooperation in other types of SF graphs. On the other
hand, our results highlight the importance of taking into ac-
count other structural properties beyond the degree distribu-
tion of the network [Da Fontura Costa, Rodrigues, Travieso
& Villas Boas, 2007] in order to capture the mechanisms that
help to fixate cooperation in real complex networks.
The second part of the article presents a degree-based mean
field approach to study analitycally networks with arbitrary
degree distribution and no degree-degree correlations (such as
random SF networks). The approach relies in a degree com-
partmentalization of cooperators and defectors strategists. We
have shown that, contrary to diffusion dynamics where a sim-
ilar approach has been applied, the degree-based mean field
does not work correctly when general initial conditions are
applied since no cooperation is observed when the tempta-
tion to defect is larger than the reward to cooperation. On the
other hand, when a particular set of initial conditions is used
(consisting in placing all the cooperators in the higher degree
classes of the network) the solution of the mean field yields a
non zero level of cooperation for a number of targeted initial
configurations. The results obtained in this latter context qual-
itatively agree with those obtained when extensive numerical
simulations on top of random SF graphs are performed.
As a conclusion, the results presented in this article com-
plete the studies about the prisoner’s dilemma on top of SF
networks showing that node-node correlations play a key role
for sustaining a high level of cooperation. Besides, the mean
field approach, although not working for all the initial con-
figurations placed in the networks, adds an analytical insight
to the field of evolutionary games on graphs, being especially
useful when targeted cooperation is studied. The mean field
approach presented here is open to the incorporation of other
ingredients such as degree-degree correlations that may help
to reproduce the levels of cooperation observed in the numer-
ical simulations.
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